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.
WE ARE WHAT WE WEAR: REVISITING STUDENT 
DRESS CODES 
Christopher B. Gilbert* 
Several weeks ago, I was at juvenile court monitoring a 
student discipline action for a school district. A fifteen-year-old 
boy had been called before the judge on a breaking and entering 
charge. He was wearing a black concert t-shirt. On the back of 
the shirt was the Grim Reaper, his skull grinning from a under 
a black velvet hood, holding his traditional scythe in one bony 
hand, and reaching around to molest the virtually nude woman 
standing in front of him. As the boy was trying to convince the 
judge he was innocent, I leaned over to the assistant district 
attorney sitting beside me and with a very knowing air, I whis-
pered, "You know, ifl were that boy's attorney, I don't believe I 
would have recommended wearing that particular shirt this 
morning." "Oh, that's nothing," responded the D.A. wryly. "You 
should have been here last week when a girl on a D.W.I. charge 
was wearing a Budweiser t-shirt." 
I learned that morning, in addition to the fact that I am not 
on the cutting edge of fashion anymore, that students will wear 
just about anything just about anywhere. What students wear 
has become a major issue in the nation's public schools. Current 
fashion trends seem to be leaning towards the extreme, or in 
the case of my friend in juvenile court, the obscene. The rising 
gang problem and the fact that gangs frequently identifY them-
selves by the clothing they wear further contributes to this 
problem. Many schools are therefore beginning to experiment 
with both traditional dress codes, which forbid the wearing of 
* Christopher B. Gilbert is an associate with Bracewell & Patterson, L.L.P. 
in Houston, Texas. Mr. Gilbert graduated from Cornell University in 1990, studied 
at the University of Edinburgh in Edinburgh, Scotland, and received his J.D. magna 
cum laude from the University of Michigan Law School in 1993. Mr. Gilbert has 
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certain categories of clothes, and with uniform codes, which 
require students to wear a uniform that can range anywhere 
from jeans and a white t-shirt to blazers and plaid skirts. 
There are many reasons for a school to adopt a dress code. A 
recent court opinion sets forth an illustrative list of such rea-
sons offered by one school district: (1) to promote a more effec-
tive climate for learning, (2) to create opportunities for self-
expression, (3) to increase campus safety and security, (4) to 
foster school unity and pride, (5) to eliminate "label competi-
tion," (6) to ensure modest dress, (7) to simplify dressing, and 
(8) to minimize cost to parents. 1 While each of these reasons 
seems to have its believers and its naysayers, most parents and 
students who challenge a school dress code do so on the grounds 
that the code violates the student's right to free speech under 
the First Amendment. 
This paper will address the First Amendment ramifications 
of school dress and uniform codes and will offer practical sug-
gestions on factors to consider in drafting "the perfect dress 
code"-something that may or may not exist. Part I discusses 
the First Amendment standards that govern speech by students 
in the public school system, and attempts to discern a rule that 
can be applied uniformly to student dress codes. Part II takes 
that rule and shows how it applies to a typical dress code dis-
pute. Part III examines the cases that have been decided by the 
federal courts regarding student dress codes, and offers nine 
principles toward drafting the perfect dress code. Part IV exam-
ines the growing use of school uniforms and the constitutional-
ity of such policies. 
I. THE LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING STUDENT FREE SPEECH 
The public schools are no strangers to the courts in First 
Amendment matters. Three of the major free speech cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court during the last thirty years have 
arisen from public school settings: Tinker u. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community District,2 Bethel School District No. 403 u. 
1. See Phoenix Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Green, 943 P.2d 836 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1997). 
2. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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Fraser, 3 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 4 Tinker, 
which was decided at the height of the Vietnam War and ad-
dressed whether students could be disciplined for wearing black 
.armbands to protest the war, offered the famous maxim that 
neither "students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights 
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."5 
Although the Court noted the need for school officials to main-
tain order and discipline, it ruled that schools could only regu-
late student speech where it would "materially and substantial-
ly interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in 
the operation of the school."6 The Supreme Court reversed the 
lower courts and found in favor of the student protestors. 7 
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court appeared to close 
the schoolhouse gates somewhat on student free speech. In 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court upheld a 
school's three-day suspension of Matthew Fraser for giving a 
student-council nominating speech the Court described as "an 
elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor."8 The Court 
found in favor of the school, ruling that school boards retain a 
significant amount of discretion to determine what speech is or 
is not appropriate in the schools.9 In a rare reference to Tinker, 
the Court compared the "political" nature of the armbands in 
3. 478 u.s. 675 (1986). 
4. 484 u.s. 260 (1988). 
5. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
6. ld. 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 
1966)) 
7. See id. at 514 
8. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678. Matthew Fraser's nominating speech reads as 
follows: 
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, 
his character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of 
Bethel, is firm. 
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If 
necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack 
things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he 
succeeds. 
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and 
every one of you. 
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you 
and the best our high school can be. 
ld. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
9. See id. at 680, 686. 
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Tinker to the "sexual" nature of Fraser's nominating speech, 
and held that Fraser's "offensively lewd and indecent speech" 
was not protected by the First Amendment. 10 
Two years after Fraser, the Court returned to the schools 
and the First Amendment. In Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier the Court ruled that a principal did not violate the 
free speech rights of a group of student journalists when he 
removed two articles (one on teen pregnancy and one on the 
effect of divorce on students) from the student-written newspa-
per.11 Deviating from the analytical approach of both Tinker 
and Fraser, the Kuhlmeier Court turned to forum analysis, 
which determines what speech is allowed on a given piece of 
public property by examining the historical access to that prop-
erty. 12 Public schools are generally considered closed forums, 13 
where the government retains the greatest amount of control 
over speech. Because the school policy gave the principal signif-
icant editorial control over the school-published newspaper, the 
Kuhlmeier Court confirmed that the newspaper was a closed 
forum and ruled that the school was entitled to regulate the 
contents of the newspaper in any reasonable manner. 14 
What is interesting about Kuhlmeier, and instructive in the 
area of school dress codes, is the Court's justification for the 
differences between its holding in Tinker in favor of the stu-
dents and its holding in Kuhlmeier in favor of the school. The 
Court made it clear that in its opinion, the two cases presented 
distinctly different factual situations, and that the two different 
types of student speech justified two different rules for regulat-
ing that speech: 
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school 
to tolerate particular student speech--the question that we 
addressed in Tinker--is different from the question whether 
the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to pro-
mote particular student speech. The former question ad-
10. ld. at 685-86. 
11. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266. 
12. See id. at 267. 
13. See, e.g., Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that elementary schools are closed forums); Hedges v. Wauconda Comm. Unit 
Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that junior high schools are 
closed forums). 
14. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270. 
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dresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal ex-
pression that happens to occur on the school premises. The 
latter question concerns educators' authority over school-spon-
sored publications, theatrical productions, and other expres-
sive activities that students, parents, and members of the 
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of 
the school. ... Educators are entitled to exercise greater con-
trol over this second form of student expression. 15 
7 
Therefore, in examining a free speech dispute on public 
school grounds, a school official must first ask how the speech 
was being delivered. If it was being delivered through the use of 
school property or as part of an official school activity, such 
speech is considered "school sponsored speech" and may be 
regulated "so long as [the regulations] are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns." 16 If it is merely coincidental 
that the speech occurred at school, the speech is dubbed "school 
tolerated speech," and can only be regulated if the speech "ma-
terially and substantially interfere[s) with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."17 Some 
courts have interpreted Fraser to establish a third test for when 
"vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech" may be 
prohibited. However, Tinker and Kuhlmeier have anchored the 
courts' approaches to student speech since 1988. 18 
II. THE APPLICATION OF TINKER AND KUHLMEIER TO STUDENT 
DRESS CODES 
Using the analytical distinction between school-sponsored 
and school-tolerated speech discussed above, it would appear 
that dress code claims should be analyzed under Tinker as op-
posed to Kuhlmeier, because any message conveyed by a stu-
dent's clothing is really just speech that "happens to occur on 
15. ld. at 270-71. 
16. ld. at 273. 
17. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
18. See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 
1992); Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 166 (D. Mass. 1994) 
(ruling that a school may prohibit such speech regardless of whether the speech 
causes a substantial disruption). 
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the school premises."19 There are some limited situations, such 
as school plays or band uniforms, in which the clothing worn by 
a student could be seen as "school-sponsored." In general, how-
ever, it is hard to argue that the messages on student clothing 
are conveyed through school property or activity or bear the 
"imprimatur of the school."20 Tinker itself involved students 
who were disciplined for wearing black armbands to protest the 
Vietnam War.21 
Although the courts considering legal challenges to dress 
codes often cite all three Supreme Court decisions, in general 
the above analysis bears out. A good example of a typical dress 
code case is Phillips v. Anderson County School District Five. 22 
Kinley, a middle school student, filed suit after he had been 
suspended from Lakeside Middle School for refusing to take off 
a jacket made to look like the Confederate battle flag. 23 After 
Kinley refused to take off his jacket, he was suspended for three 
days. 24 He returned to school with his father, wearing the 
jacket. When he refused to take it off again, he was suspended 
for another five days. 25 A deadlock ensued: the school refused to 
allow Kinley to wear the jacket, and his father refused to send 
him to school without it. 26 
Kinley's school had a dress code policy stating that "attire 
should not interfere with classroom instruction" and that 
"[o]ffending students will be advised to correct their dress prob-
lem or visit the office where a parent will be called to bring 
appropriate clothes or pick up the student.'127 Lakeside's policy 
also required all students to obey school personnel. 28 Relying on 
Tinker, the court found that the school did not violate Kinley's 
First Amendment rights, because it had a reasonable basis for 
predicting that Kinley's jacket would produce a substantial and 
material disruption of and interference with the educational 
19. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270-71. 
20. Id. at 271. 
21. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
22. 987 F. Supp. 488 (D. S.C. 1997). 
23. See id. at 491. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. 
27. Phillips v. Anderson County Sch. Dist., 987 F. Supp at 494. 
28. See id. 
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process at Lakeside. 29 Indeed, the evidence showed that several 
recent racially-motivated fights at Lakewood had been sparked 
by Confederate clothing, and that Kinley had himself been in-
volved in one of those fights. 30 Although Kinley argued that 
school officials could not rely on prior disruptions at Lakeside 
in predicting a substantial and material disruption because 
such disruptions had taken place outside of the context of class-
room instruction, the court rejected the argument as unrealistic 
by stating: "Nor can it be reasonably contended that arguments 
or fights which occur immediately before or after a class have 
no disruptive effect upon the teaching and learning process 
during actual class time."31 
III. DRAFTING THE PERFECT DRESS CODE: NINE PRINCIPLES 
Drafting the perfect dress code is difficult because it may be 
outdated before it is implemented. A dress code is as unique to 
a particular school as the clothes the school's students wear. 
What may work wonders in an inner-city urban school may 
have little effect in the suburbs and actually may have a nega-
tive effect in a rural school. "Form" or "boiler-plate" dress codes 
usually end up irritating everyone and solving nothing. How-
ever, some general principles can be extracted from case law 
and practical experience to guide school administrators in es-
tablishing a dress code for their schools. Nine such principles 
follow. 
Principle One: In drafting and enforcing dress codes, school 
officials must adopt the Tinker standard. Experience shows 
that in most dress code disputes, the courts are likely to find in 
favor of the student unless facts exist that would reasonably 
lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption of, or 
material interference with, school activities. For example, in 
Mcintire v. Bethel School, Independent School District No. 3,32 a 
student was disciplined for wearing a t-shirt that read "[t]he 
best of the night's adventures are reserved for people with noth-
29. See id. at 493. 
30. See id. 
31. ld. at 493. 
32. 804 F. Supp. 1415 (W.D. Okl. 1992). 
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ing planned," which was a variation of a popular alcohol adver-
tising slogan.33 The court found that under Tinker, the student's 
First Amendment rights had been violated, because no evidence 
existed of any disruption caused by the wearing of the t-shirt. It 
did not help the school's cause that the student testified she 
already had worn the t-shirt on numerous occasions without 
causing disruption or being noticed by school officials. 
Principle Two: Schools may prohibit obscene, lewd, or vul-
gar clothing, but must be careful when drafting policies that 
discriminate against speech on the basis of content. In Pyle v. 
South Hadley School Committee,34 two brothers challenged the 
school dress code policy after being told they could not wear t-
shirts that read, "See Dick Drink. See Dick Drive. See Dick Die. 
Don't be a Dick," and "Coed Naked Band: Do It To the 
Rhythm."35 The court considered two provisions of the school 
dress code: a prohibition on clothing that "[h] as comments or 
designs that are obscene, lewd or vulgar," and a prohibition on 
clothing that "[i]s directed toward or intended to harass, 
threaten, intimidate, or demean an individual or group of indi-
viduals, because of sex, color, race, religion, handicap, national 
origin, or sexual orientation."36 The court upheld the first provi-
sion, ruling that schools could prohibit such speech under Fra-
ser regardless of whether the speech had caused a substantial 
disruption.37 However, the court declared the second provision 
unconstitutional because such a provision was aimed directly at 
the content of the speech, and not at its potential for disruption 
or vulgarity.38 
Principle Three: School administrators should make sure 
they can explain why the dress code policy was passed and 
what prompted the specifics of the dress code. At least one 
court has reversed the summary judgment decision of a lower 
court's upholding an anti-gang dress code because, although 
there was evidence of a gang problem and evidence that the 
33. !d. at 1418. 
34. 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1994). 
35. !d. at 158. 
36. !d. at 162. 
37. The court rejected the argument that the "See Dick" shirt was really a 
political (anti-drinking) message: "At least in high school, a political message does not 
justify a vulgar medium." !d. at 169. 
38. See id. at 173. 
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dress code addressed that gang problem, there was nothing in 
the record showing that the principal had passed the specific 
dress code because of the gang problem. 39 A preamble or state-
ment of purpose is a good idea because it preserves for future 
generations the reasons behind the dress code. 
Principle Four: Although schools frequently create dress 
codes to combat what they perceive as the growing presence of 
gangs on school grounds, schools must not rely on vague "anti-
gang" rhetoric to justify a dress code when the evidence does 
not bear out a gang presence. In Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified 
School District,40 a California court upheld a high school dress 
code that prohibited students from wearing sports clothing.41 
Because school administrators had determined that gang mem-
bers wore sports clothing to advertise their presence in the 
schools, the school district implemented a ban on sports cloth-
ing to combat the growing perception that the district's schools 
had a gang problem.42 Though the court upheld the policy at the 
high school level, it held the same dress code to be unconstitu-
tional at the middle and elementary school levels because no 
evidence of a gang problem existed at the elementary school 
and only minimal evidence of gangs existed at the middle 
school.43 Jeglin shows that while the courts will back schools 
when they adopt dress codes to fight gangs, they demand evi-
dence of those gangs, especially at the lower-level schools where 
gangs are less common. 
Jeglin also provides a cautionary corollary to principle 
three: schools should review periodically their dress codes for 
currency. The Jeglin court was somewhat amused (and the 
school rather embarrassed) by the testimony of the student 
body president that gang members wore white t-shirts and 
dickie pants, not sports clothing.44 Although the court found 
that there was enough evidence of a gang presence and at least 
the chance that the dress code would negate that presence to 
justify the dress code, it did suggest to school officials that they 
"from time to time" review the dress code to ensure that it was 
39. See Adams v. Township of Redford, 85 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 1996). 
40. 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
41. See id. at 1462. 
42. See id. at 1460. 
43. See id. at 1462. 
44. See id. 
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still relevant to the current gang problem.45 As most school 
officials will agree, gangs are a constantly changing phenome-
non on any school campus. School officials should regularly 
review dress codes passed to address gang problems to make 
sure that the gangs have not outgrown the dress code. 
Principle Five: Anti-gang dress restrictions must be drawn 
carefully to avoid being declared void for vagueness. The prob-
lem with using dress codes to combat gang presence is that 
with the exception of the large, well-established national gangs 
like the Bloods, Crips, and Latin Kings, most local gangs are 
not firmly committed to their colors and signs. A school district 
whose gang members dress all in black may pass a dress code 
prohibiting students form wearing all black clothing, and the 
next day discover that the gang members wearing all white 
clothes. 
To prevent anti-gang dress codes from becoming obsolete 
before the ink on them was even dry, many schools adopted 
codes that prohibited things like "gang-related apparel" or 
"gang insignia," reasoning that this would give them the flexi-
bility to change the enforcement of their codes as the gangs 
changed their colors or clothes. But such vague prohibitions 
opened the schools to legal challenge from a completely differ-
ent angle, as highlighted by the recent decision in Chalifoux v. 
New Caney Independent School District.46 The New Caney 
school district passed an anti-gang dress code that prohibited 
"gang-related" apparelY Two students were told they could not 
wear their rosaries outside their clothing on school property 
because it violated the district's ban on "gang-related" ap-
parel.48 A school district police officer had determined that rosa-
ries were symbols of the United Homies after a confessed mem-
ber had told him that he wore his rosaries outside his shirt as a 
gang symbol, and the officer had observed several other known 
gang members wearing rosaries outside their shirts. 49 It was 
conceded at trial that the two students in question were not 
45. Id. 
46. 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
47. Id. at 663. 
48. ld. 
49. See id. at 664. 
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gang members and were wearing the rosaries for sincere reli-
gious reasons.50 
The court found the rosaries to be symbolic speech protected 
by the First Amendment, and analyzed the right of the students 
to wear the rosaries under Tinker. 51 Although the court agreed 
that schools are entitled to some degree of flexibility in drafting 
disciplinary rules, the New Caney policy was found to be void 
for vagueness because the policy did not adequately define 
"gang-related apparel." The policy also gave too much discretion 
to school officials to define "gang-related apparel."52 The student 
handbook provided examples of "gang-related apparel" and 
stated that a "sample list of specific items that law enforcement 
agencies consider gang-related is available in the principal's 
office."53 However, not only were rosaries not listed as gang 
apparel, but the promised list in the principal's office did not 
even exist. 54 
The court also found that the dress code policy violated the 
rights of the students under the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment. 55 The court required the students to show a sin-
cere religious belief that was burdened by the school's dress 
code regulations, and then held that the First Amendment pro-
tects the students' rights to wear rosaries outside their shirts, 
though wearing the rosaries was neither required by the Catho-
lic faith nor common among practicing Catholics. 56 The court 
reasoned that it was undisputed that these particular students 
wore the rosaries for religious reasons. 57 The court analyzed the 
dress code under a hybrid free exercise/free speech claim, which 
subjected the policy to a more rigorous standard of review. 58 
The court required the district to show that the regulation bore 
more than a reasonable relation to its stated purpose. 59 The 
court then balanced that showing against the burden placed on 
50. See id. at 663. 
51. See Chalifoux v. New Caney, 976 F. Supp. 659, 665-66 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
52. Id. at 669. 
53. Id. at 663. 
54. Id. 
55. See Chalifoux v. New Caney, 976 F. Supp. 659, 671 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
56. See id. at 670. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. at 671. 
59. See id. 
14 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1999 
the students' religious rights. 60 While the court did not dispute 
that dress codes might be appropriate under some circum-
stances for regulating gang activity, it ruled that the school 
must employ means more effective than a blanket ban on wear-
ing rosaries. 61 
Chalifoux highlights the disturbing trend of gangs adopting 
symbols or colors that have independent, and sometimes consti-
tutionally protected, meaning. In Stephenson v. Davenport 
Community School District,62 the Eighth Circuit dealt with a 
student who wore the tattoo of a cross between her index finger 
and her thumb, which the school considered to be a gang sym-
bol.63 Although the student specifically disavowed the existence 
of any message in her tattoo, the court was clearly disturbed by 
the prospect of prohibiting a student from wearing a religious 
symbol for any reason. 64 When gangs adopt religious or other 
common symbols as their signs, administrators face the practi-
cal difficulty of determining whether a student wearing a cross 
really has a sincerely held religious belief in the cross. 
Principle Six: Students do not have a constitutional right to 
wear baggy pants. In a decision sure to please school adminis-
trators and fashion critics alike, a New Mexico court ruled that 
a school dress code, which forbade wearing sagging pants, did 
not violate a student's First Amendment free speech right. 65 
Recognizing that wearing baggy pants is not "speech" in the 
traditional sense, the court turned to the Supreme Court's flag 
burning case66 to determine the proper test for when non-verbal 
conduct could be considered "expressive conduct" and thus pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 67 The court ruled that the stu-
dent needed to show (1) an intention to "convey a particularized 
message"; and (2) "a great likelihood that the message would be 
understood by those who observe the conduct."68 Although 
Bivens was able to pass the first prong (he claimed that his 
60. See Chalifoux v. New Caney, 976 F. Supp. 659, 671 (S.D. Tex 1997). 
61. See id. 
62. 110 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997). 
63. See id. at 1305. 
64. See id. at 1308. 
65. See Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556 (D. N.M. 1995). 
66. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
67. Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 560. 
68. ld. 
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pants were intended to show a link to his black identity and 
black culture) he could not show that others would understand 
his message.69 The court noted that it was far more likely that 
his sagging pants would be seen as a sign of gang affiliation, 
acknowledging that "not every defiant act by a high school stu-
dent is constitutionally protected speech."70 
Principle Seven: As with most restrictive rules in the school 
setting, the courts appear more inclined to uphold rules aimed 
at elementary students than they do rules aimed at high school 
students. In Baxter v. Vigo County School Corporation, 71 a court 
considered a claim that a school principal had prevented an 
elementary school student from wearing t-shirts that said "Un-
fair Grades," "Racism," and "I Hate Lost Creek" as part of her 
complaint (and the complaint of her parents) about grades and 
racism at the school. 72 The court cleared the principal on quali-
fied immunity grounds, ruling that the student's right to wear 
the t-shirts was not "clearly established."73 The court ques-
tioned whether the Supreme Court's decisions in Tinker and 
Fraser were applicable to students of grammar school age. 74 
This is consistent with the Supreme Court's view that the age 
of the student audience is an appropriate consideration in de-
termining what speech to allow on school grounds.75 
Principle Eight: Paradoxically, the broader the ban, the 
more likely the courts seem to be to uphold it. What the courts 
are concerned about in First Amendment cases is the suppres-
sion of the message the speaker wants to convey to his or her 
audience. Telling a student that she cannot wear her t-shirt 
that says "[t]he best of the night's adventures are reserved for 
people with nothing planned" obviously focuses directly on the 
particular message that that particular student wants to con-
vey, usually after the student has already worn the t-shirt (and 
69. See id. at 560-61. 
70. ld. 
71. 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994). 
72. Id. at 730. 
73. ld. at 738. 
74. See id. 
75. See, e.g., Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272 (stating that "In addition, a school 
must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience 
in determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics, 
which might range from the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting 
to the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high school setting"). 
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hence the message) to school. 76 Telling an entire school of stu-
dents that they cannot wear the broad class of sports clothing77 
or baggy pants 78 is somehow seen as less offensive to the First 
Amendment; it does not focus on a particular message but more 
on the manner in which the message in delivered. The fact that 
such broad, categorical bans are usually passed before any 
problems arise demonstrates that the school was not singling 
out any particular students. 
Principle Nine: If a male student wants to wear his hair 
long, the school board should call its attorney. This may sound 
drastic, but the courts of appeals have widely disagreed about 
whether the Constitution protects student hair length. For 
example, the Fifth Circuit declared in 1972 that male students 
do not have a constitutional right to wear their hair long. 79 The 
court was so emphatic about its new rule that it declared that 
"[w]here the complaint merely alleges the constitutional inval-
idity of a high school hair and grooming regulation, the district 
courts are directed to grant an immediate motion to dismiss."80 
Courts such as the Eighth Circuit, however, have held that 
students have a constitutionally-protected right to govern their 
own appearances.81 Although the court held that this right was 
not absolute, and that the school could infringe on the students' 
rights if necessary in order to carry out is educational mission, 
it rejected the vague and unsubstantiated fears of administra-
tors that long hair would cause disruptions. 82 
Even if the local federal circuit has determined that male 
students do not have a federal constitutional right to wear their 
hair long, check the local state court decisions to make sure 
that they have not established a different rule under the state 
constitution or a state statute. For example, in the 1990s, the 
Texas Supreme Court has twice considered equal protection 
challenges to school district hair-length regulations, once under 
76. See, e.g., Mcintire v. Bethel lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 804 F. Supp. 1415 1418 
(W.D. Okl. 1992). , 
77. See Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 
1993). 
78. See Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556 (D. N.M. 1995). 
79. See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972). 
80. !d. at 618. 
81. See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971). 
82. See id. at 1075-77. 
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the equal rights clause of the Texas constitution, 83 and once 
under a state statute guaranteeing equal rights for students. 84 
Although on both occasions the court sided with the Fifth Cir-
cuit's Karr u. Schmidt decision and ruled that a male student 
does not have a protected right to wear his hair long, the 
Toungate court overturned a bitter appellate court decision 
siding with the student in his dispute with the school district. 85 
Finally, even in circuits and states where a male student's 
right to wear long hair is not protected, school officials should 
still endeavor to determine why the male student wants to wear 
his hair long. A Texas school district was enjoined from enforc-
ing its dress code against American Indian students, which 
would have required the students to cut their hair. 86 Even un-
der the Fifth Circuit's strict Karr u. Schmidt decision, the dis-
trict court ruled that requiring Native American students to cut 
their hair would have violated the First Amendment, because 
the students were able to articulate a protected religious inter-
est in their long hair that existed apart from any speech inter-
ests they might have made. 87 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Dress code disputes are alive and well, and are not likely to 
disappear any time soon. A Connecticut school district received 
numerous complaints in January 1998 after it considered ban-
ning clothing from the popular television show "South Park."88 
An Ohio elementary school student was recently removed from 
school after he wore a t-shirt that read "Born to Raze Hell," 
83. See Barber v. Colorado Indep. Sch. Dist., 901 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1995). 
84. See Board of Trustees of Bastrop Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Toungate, 958 S.W.2d 
365 (Tex. 1997). 
85. See id. at 373. 
86. See Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. 
Supp. 1319 CE.D. Tex. 1993). 
87. See id. at 1328. 
88. See Phillip Taylor, Connecticut school system considers banning 'South 
Park' clothing (visited January 7, 1999) 
<http://www.freedomforum.org/speech/news/980130a.asp>; Corey Q. Bradley, School 
board scraps plans for 'South Park' clothing ban (visited January 7, 1999) 
<http://www.freedomforum.org/speech/1998/2/18southpart.asp>. 
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which he bought at a religious gathering and wore to show his 
pride in his Christian beliefs. 89 
The nine principles discussed above show that drafting a 
successful dress code is both an art and a science. Because 
courts are likely to find in favor of the student, unless facts 
exist that would reasonably lead school officials to forecast sub-
stantial disruption of or material interference with school activ-
ities, and because courts will examine why the dress code policy 
was passed and what prompted the specific provisions of the 
dress code, a school district must be able to present a demon-
strable evidentiary foundation for its dress code. 
However the nine principles also show that a court is as 
likely to be influenced by its gut feeling about the fairness of 
the dress code as it is by the hard evidence before it. Courts are 
more likely to defer to the school's judgment when the school is 
operating on a broad policy level by dealing with entire catego-
ries of clothes than when the school is targeting a specific stu-
dent's t-shirt. Regulations that appear to be trying to protect a 
school's younger, more impressionable students will be viewed 
more favorably than attempts to censor the speech of high 
school students who are mere years away from responsible 
adulthood. 
The keys to a successful dress code policy are common 
sense, the ability to compromise, and the desire of all parties 
involved to work through their differences. However, the sheer 
number of disputes that have arisen over the last few years 
show that these goals are often difficult to achieve in practice. 
Although for every rule there is an exception, these nine princi-
ples provide meaningful guidance for drafting a legally defensi-
ble dress code. But until the Supreme Court takes another stu-
dent free speech case, especially a dress code case, the best that 
we can hope for are signposts from the lower courts to give us 
some direction in drafting dress codes and uniform policies. 
89. See Jeremy Learning, Sixth-grader's religious T-shirt disrupted school, 
principal says (visited January 7, 1999) 
<http://www.freedomforum.org/religion/1998/ll/13ohioshirt.asp>. 
